ShepherdsDog ShepherdsDog:
Yes, seeing that Hyperion is basing his opinion on what a 'relative' told him, and Gunnair is stating facts, based on his experiences as a cox'n currently serving on one of the ships in question.
I'm not naming my relative out of a concern of both his and my own privacy, . But if i may assume that he is in fact a Perma-Shad what it does mean is that his opinion is biased. Reservists don't like to be reminded that they are not in fact reg force. One of two things happens, after a couple of years they either go home or go reg force. So Gunnair has a vested interest in defending a system that doesn't work for a number of reasons.
But here is the original CBC article
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/05/ ... nd014.html$1:
The order to cut Canada's 12 coastal defence vessels by half has been rescinded — just one day after it was announced, according to the country's chief of defence staff.
"We're going to rescind the order and have a look at the resources that are being provided, not only the money … but also the crewing and what we can do to maximize the available personnel, not only in the navy but the rest of the Canadian Forces to ensure that the navy's next 100 years is as successful as the last," Gen. Walter Natynczyk told a press conference in Ottawa Friday.
On Thursday, a navy spokeswoman told CBC News that a shortage of money and sailors would force Canada's navy to mothball half its fleet of 12 coastal vessels used to patrol the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
The decision on allocation of resources is "complicated," said Natynczyk and based only partially on budget.
"The fact is that with the ships, we have different classes of ships — supply ship, destroyers, frigates and maritime coastal defence vessels among others," he said.
"With any service, not only the navy, but the army and air force, it is resources and manning to determine what is at high readiness."
On Thursday, the navy said the move is necessary to continue the primary mission of defending Canada.
"Upon close examination of resources and priorities, this was deemed necessary to safeguard and optimize our operational capability, both now and in the future," wrote Denise LaViolette, a navy spokeswoman.
The plan was to keep three ships on each coast and put the others in long-term storage.
The navy has not said how much money it would need to keep the whole fleet active or how much it would have saved by reducing the fleet by half.
The Kingston-class ships were built in the mid-1990s to hunt for mines that could block Canadian ports. They are lightly armed and can be converted to carry a small underwater robot or even platoons of soldiers.
Read more:
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/05/ ... z0tXAlk8fHBut here is a very precise and detailed article from a former commander of one of the MCDV's
http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/forum/view.php?topic=35$1:
The Naval Reserve Personnel Situation:
Crewing of the A/OPV by reservists won't be easy
Derek Carroll
A number of commentators in this forum have proposed to take the crews from the MCDVs and move them into the A/OPVs with the assumption that this will be fairly easy and relatively painless as compared to manning them with 'scarce' regular force talent. Alternatively others have suggested that the Naval Reserve man these vessels in addition to the MCDVs leaving the regular force to man the 'combat' ships. As a long serving Naval Reserve officer who has commanded both an MCDV and an NRD I can point out that this conversion from MCDV to A/OPV is not as easy as it seems and offers no cost savings what so ever and I have my doubts about additional tasking for the Naval Reserve. But before I get into that analysis I think a few points should be made about the regular/reserve terminology made in various posts.
Since the introduction of the MCDVs in the middle 90's the term 'Naval Reserve' has become increasingly meaningless. The vast majority of Naval Reservists who actually man the MCDVS are from a cadre of approximately 1500 or so personnel who are for all intents and purposes in the regular force. Few of these people have civilian careers worth mentioning and most have long since abandoned any university programs that they may have once embarked on. They have to a large extent moved to either coast, Quebec City (where Naval Reserve HQ and CFFS(Q) are located) or Ottawa and are permanently stationed there. They are by and large uninvolved with the part-time reserves. Instead they move from one three year 'contract' (or posting) to another with some eye towards maintaining a sea/shore balance to their careers. When posted to sea-going billets they are paid precisely what their regular force counterparts are paid and are entitled to all of the benefits associated with the regular force including a recently introduced pension plan. There is no cost saving associated with these reservists.
The training received by the naval reserve is, as previous commentators suggested, largely the same as that found in the regular force. In point of fact an increasing number of 'reservists' in this full-time cadre are in fact ex-regular force who for one reason or another have decided to leave the regular navy. So arguably their training is identical. However the issue here lies with the required qualifications of the MARS officers onboard the MCDVs as well as other trades. Currently most MCDV COs have what is called a 'Minor Warship Command Qualification' which allows them to command vessels of up to approximately 2000 tons (i.e. think about the old HMCS Cormorant). The watchkeepers have a similarly identified qualification and neither has ice-specific training as with regular force MARS officers. If these vessels are as heavy as the SVALBARD class then these officers may not be qualified to serve on them.
The difference in watchkeeping/command qualifications for MCDVs is largely due to the fact that they are not formally trained (i.e. unless they have transferred to the regular force) in handling the complex operations of a frigate's Ops Room but are trained for the somewhat more simple issues found in the ops room of an MCDV. That is not to say that they have not gained experience in various exercises but a more meaningful operations training programme will have to be developed to equip these officers for the tasks at hand. The A/OPV as discussed will probably not have the complex ops room of an FFH/DDH but some sort of additional training and/or experience may be required to convert these MCDV officers. The exact specifications of the vessel are unknown but the navy may have to re-think how they define a 'reserve' BWK if the A/OPVs are as heavy as imagined by some.
Next and by far the most difficult training issue lies with the engineers onboard MCDVs. These are not the Diesel Mechanics as found on a FFH/DDH or AOR but are in fact Marine Engine Systems Operators (MESOs). While they receive much of the same introductory training as the Regular Force they do not receive the longer training in diesel theory and repair skills their counterparts receive. The training difference can be as long as 18 months for a more junior engineer and presumably more for a Engineering WK or a CERA. The real problem is that these are precisely the skills that will be required by the engineers of the A/OPVs as they operate far from logistical and maintenance bases (i.e. in the Arctic). I was recently informed that for a MESO to stand watch on an ORCA (which is intended to operate solely on Canada's west coast and rarely to leave sight of land) MESO's would have to undergo 18 months of additional training at CFFS(E). Imagine how much more will be necessary for a vessel which spends at least half of its life thousands of miles away from any sort of meaningful repair facility. Finally the ET's and NET's onboard are all drawn from the same scarce regular force pool.
All of the equivalent trades in the Regular Force (i.e. MARS, Diesel Mechanic etc) have been described in various navy documents as being in 'crisis'. Arguably since we do not have a formal plan for the DDH replacement yet (if ever) and even when it is announced it will be some time before delivery I would suggest that it would be somewhat more cost advantageous to de-commission the Tribals and man these vessels with already qualified regular force sailors. In all likelihood a mix of so-called reservists and regular force personnel will be required.
On the other side of this coin the Naval Reserve Divisions (NRDs) scattered across the country are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit, retain and maintain any sort of sea keeping skills whatsoever. The challenges facing the CF recruiter have been commented on and discussed ad nauseum, suffice to say they are no easier for the NRD than they are for any one else with the additional challenge of having no organic operational role or sea-going task to maintain people' s interest in the NRD while they undergo their basic and initial trades training (not to mention the retention of more senior personnel). The attrition rate for relatively new entry naval reservists in NRDs is high and likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Furthermore in my experience as a CO of an NRD I found very few so called 'full-time' reservists willing to transition back to the 'part-time' world and fewer still who were capable of the time management skills required. In point of fact in my three years in command I was just as likely to have a regular force sailor transfer to the part-time side of the navy as a full time reservist and their retention rates once required were about the same.
In fact the part-time Naval Reserve has been slowly depleting its sea-going resources to man the MCDVs over the last ten years. Most NRDs in this country are in fact challenged and some have been permanently damaged by the advent of the 'full-time' manning concept behind the MCDVs. Less than half are capable of generating their own leadership and must rely on augments from either the regular force or the 'full-time' reserve to even function as recruiting centers. In 2006 only six of 24 NRDs had a part-time, locally generated and located command team (i.e. CO, X) and Coxswain) all others relied upon this augmentation. The average age of part-time MARS officers, MESO's and other 'hard-sea' trades is steadily increasing and most NRDs have relatively few qualified sea-going personnel in their part-time ranks. To add to the complexity of these issues is the fact that a substantial source of recruiting for the regular force comes from the cadre of full-time reservists. So you may want to send a 'reserve' sailor on a long arctic mission in a desolate part of the world on an A/OPV which his regular force counter part has no interest in. His/her response may well be to transfer to the regular force and join that frigate deployed to the Middle East. His or her NRD will have no one available to replace them on the A/OPV.
In short, the idea that the 'Naval Reserve' is either going to able to take on the additional task of manning the A/OPVs while manning the MCDVs or alternatively is going to quickly transition to the A/OPVs is in my opinion overly optimistic and I believe relatively simplistic. The 'part-time' navy in particular has paid a heavy price to man the MCDVs and as such there is no large base to draw from as there was in the 1990s. More realistic manning scenarios will have to be developed with an eye towards a more sustainable approach.
This serves accentuates my post from earlier that the 'reservists' who currently serve on long term contracts are 'reservists' in name only and are for all intents and purposes reg force already. That is not the issue, the issue as Ltcdr Carroll pointed out is recruitment and retention
but let me highlight this point once again
$1:
In fact the part-time Naval Reserve has been slowly depleting its sea-going resources to man the MCDVs over the last ten years. Most NRDs in this country are in fact challenged and some have been permanently damaged by the advent of the 'full-time' manning concept behind the MCDVs. Less than half are capable of generating their own leadership and must rely on augments from either the regular force or the 'full-time' reserve to even function as recruiting centers. In 2006 only six of 24 NRDs had a part-time, locally generated and located command team (i.e. CO, X) and Coxswain) all others relied upon this augmentation. The average age of part-time MARS officers, MESO's and other 'hard-sea' trades is steadily increasing and most NRDs have relatively few qualified sea-going personnel in their part-time ranks. To add to the complexity of these issues is the fact that a substantial source of recruiting for the regular force comes from the cadre of full-time reservists. So you may want to send a 'reserve' sailor on a long arctic mission in a desolate part of the world on an A/OPV which his regular force counter part has no interest in. His/her response may well be to transfer to the regular force and join that frigate deployed to the Middle East. His or her NRD will have no one available to replace them on the A/OPV.
Which is what i have been telling people
Which is what i have been telling people, now Gunnair maybe a Cox'n on one of the MCDV's but he wasn't and isn't a Commanding Officer. In fact Gunnair is smack dab in the middle of the problem. He if i understand this correctly, is what is called a "Full time reservist" (an oxymoron if there ever was one). and he may feel strongly in his views, but no matter how strong his commitment it doesn't change the numbers involved. The reserves cannot man on a consistent basis the MCDV's. They asked for and were given the role of MCD at largely their own request and as LtCdr Carroll pointed out this new 'role' has damaged the NRD's in their home cities because as it stands the people who do commit to long contracts aren't really reserves ,they're simply another form of Reg force, and the people who can't commit to anything like those lengths of time end up quitting, which in of itself is a huge waste of funds.
So again the Reserves as they are currently set up are inefficient and ineffective. Inefficient because there is no point in traning somone as a full time reservist when that person can either- with very short notice, leave the force altogether or transfer to reg force, which leaves another manning gap in the Reserve force. Ineffective because the can't carry out thier mission, which is MCD for both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and they can't do that because they cant man the ships for the reason stated above
The reserves should be transitioned back to a strictly part time force and with role defined once again as support for Reg force vessels. current "Permanent "Reservists" would be given the option for transfer to Reg force, back to essentially seasonal contracts or release. now because of the new technology we certain trades would be limited. As a previous poster pointed out there is little reason for "Mars" officers only since the current crop of Reg force officers have much more in depth training and i don't believe ti's possible fora an Officer with only a BWK to effectively serve on a FFH or what have you
Bosn's would be relatively safe because at the end of the day it doesn't matter if your reserve or reg force when most of you work is manual labour, and a rope work just doesn't require years of training.
Engineer might have to be done away with altogether, not sure about that but it seems that it would take far longer to train effectively an engineer, when the training funds would be better spent on Reg force engineers.
Other hard sea trades would have to be evaulted individually, i know that years ago the Reserves forcibly re-mustered virtually every NRadOp (Naval Radio Operator) to NavSig (Naval Signalman)because the equipment they used on gate vessels and that which they trained with was useless on DDH's and the Navsig job was much less technology intensive - at least at that time most Navsigs spent the majority of their time either signalling ships in formation (be it semaphore, flashing light or Flags), as tactical communicators during Fleet Manoeuvers or spend their days typing messages to be sent
CKA Uber 
CKA Uber 
