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Linking up with an old Vive posting:<br />
<br /> <a href="http://www.vivelecanada.ca/article.php/20041124083312151">http://www.vivelecanada.ca/article.php/20041124083312151</a><br /> <br /> Also, the story is not new, nice "scoop" National Post--not a slow news day, so one wonders what makes it fit to print:<br /> <br /> <a href="http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1092275036461_3?s_name=&no_ads">http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1092275036461_3?s_name=&no_ads</a>=<br /> <br /> And now for a a very relevant paper:<br /> <br /> <a href="http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Charron,%20Andrea-Paper.pdf">http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Charron,%20Andrea-Paper.pdf</a><br /> <br /> "This paper will explore ... whether or not it is possible to achieve a comprehensive and all inclusive<br /> strategy – one that allows for international commercial shipping in a Canadian-owned Passage."<br /> <br /> and<br /> <br /> "A very short explanation of the current legal conundrum posed by the Passage is that while Canada maintains it falls within historic, internal waters which gives Canada the exclusive right to decide which ships may and may not enter the Passage, the United States (US) maintains the Passage is an international strait and therefore free access must be automatically and necessarily granted to all vessels entering the Passage."<br /> <br /> <br /> Also<br /> <br /> "Canada had secured environmental protection for the Passage without having to raise the sovereignty issue. All of this being said, this legislation could be discussed in the Sovereignty First and Foremost category for in today’s terms, it is further evidence of Canada’s assertion that<br /> the Passage is part of Canada’s internal waters. However, while the pollution Act does refer to Canadian waters, the calculation of the 100-mile zone begins at Canadian land and there is no mention of Canada’s use of straight baselines. This is likely because the straight baseline method of calculation was relatively new when this legislation was conceived and inclusion of this, specifically, would have antagonized the US even further. As well, Canada was careful not to antagonize Denmark specifically allowing for alterations should the 100-mile zone encroach on Greenland’s waters."<br /> <br /> So the sovereignty dispute is probably a legal stalemate in which the Canada-Denmark relation is critical.<br /> <br /> "If the Passage is to become the hotbed of international shipping everyone expects, coordination between the littoral states of: the US, Canada, and Denmark/Greenland will be essential. Regardless of whether or not jurisdictional issues are sorted, pragmatic issues such as what<br /> country shall be responsible for providing what services needs to be resolved. Young offers just<br /> a cursory list of those services that will need managing and funding including:<br /> <br /> • Construction standards for tankers<br /> • Rules for safe operations in Arctic waters<br /> • Traffic control<br /> • Aids to navigation (including icebreaking – by far the most important, ice-forecasting and rescue)<br /> • User fees<br /> • Environmental protection<br /> • Socioeconomic integrity of nearby communities<br /> • Liability for spills and other damages<br /> • Clean-up procedures<br /> "<br /> <br /> So, you've got two smaller, more social-democratic nations who want a say in (and economic yield from) the above, and one superpower more clearly committed to a laissez-faire approach to use of the passage.<br /> <br /> Moreover:<br /> <br /> "It is highly likely that these services, like protection of the environment and resources can benefit from international cooperation especially if the issue of sovereignty is “set to the side”."<br /> <br /> The converse is perhaps more true: if a pissing contest over sovereignty can be decidedly *not* set aside, it is highly unlikely the two "do-gooder" nations will be able to leverage their relationship to implement an environmental/resource protection strategy.<br /> <br /> If Canada has some management interest in the passage, proceeds from its management could allow domestic economic/environmental control and sovereign development of arctic gas, oil and other resources. If not, we'll have no choice but to seek FDI from...guess who?<br /> <br /> Canada can agree to disagree with Denmark over sovereignty of this small, desolate island, or proceed with the dispute and jeopardize sovereignty over the entire arctic. If someone can come up with a realistic power play that gets us both, I'd like to hear it.<br /> |
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